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Abstract: 
The current relationship between the two European courts has been 
discussed in some great detail while the future of that relationship has been 
widely neglected.  This is somewhat surprising as the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and with it of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as 
the EU’s accession to the ECHR are probably going to take place before too 
long.  The article first examines Article 52 (3) of the Charter which prescribes 
that the ECHR be the minimum standard of human rights in the EU.  It is 
argued that that Art 52 (3) does not entail a reference to the ECtHR’s case 
law so that the ECJ will not be bound by that case law.  After an accession of 
the EU to the ECHR, it is likely that both courts will assert that they have 
exclusive jurisdiction over the ECHR in inter-state cases, which creates a 
jurisdictional conflict for which a solution must be found.  In addition, the 
article explores whether after an accession, the Bosphorus case law will have 
a future and whether the dictum found in Opinion 1/91 will be applicable, 
according to which the ECJ is bound by the decisions of courts created by an 
international agreement to which the EC is a party. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
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In recent years, the legal relationship between different international courts 
has attracted more and more scholarly attention.  The so-called proliferation 
of international courts and tribunals has led to a debate about potential 
jurisdictional overlaps or even conflicts between these courts.1  The present 
article will focus on the future relationship between two of the busiest 
international courts in the world: the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (ECJ) and the European Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR).  In a 
preliminary step, the well-known present relationship between these two 
courts will be briefly examined. On that basis their future relationship will be 
explored.  The two court‟s relationship is likely to change in two scenarios: 
first, once the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has entered into force and 
second, after an accession of the European Communities to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).   
II. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
Presently, the European Community is not a party to the ECHR and therefore 
not directly bound by it.2  According to the well-established case law of the 
                                            
1
  On this discussion see for instance:  Tullio Treves “Conflicts Between the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the international Court of Justice” 31 New 
York University Journal of International Law & Politics (1999) 809;  Hugh Thirlway ”The 
Proliferation of International Judicial Organs and the Formation of International Law” in W. P. 
Heere (ed.), International Law and The Hague´s 750th Anniversary (Springer, The Hague 
1999), 433; Shane Spelliscy “The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the 
Armor” 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2001), 143;  Gilbert Guillaume “The 
proliferation of international judicial bodies: The outlook for the international legal order” 
Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 27 October 
2000 <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1>, 23 April 2009; 
Jean-Marie Dupuy “The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal 
System and the International Court of Justice” 31 New York University Journal of International 
Law & Politics (1999), 791; Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions Between International 
Courts and Tribunals (OUP, Oxford 2004), 1-11. 
2
  The EC is presently not competent to accede to the ECHR: Opinion 2/94 Accession 
to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; analyses of that opinion can be found in: PANOS Koutrakos 
EU International Relations Law (Hart, Oxford 2006), 128-132; Piet Eeckhout External 
Relations of the European Community (OUP, Oxford 2004), 82-87; Anthony Arnull “Left To Its 
Own Devices? Opinion 2/94 and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European 
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ECJ, which is reflected in Article 6 (2) EU, the ECHR constitutes the minimum 
standard for human rights in the EU because all EU Member States are also 
bound by the ECHR.3  However, this does not imply that the EC itself is bound 
by the ECHR. As long as the EC itself is not a member to the Convention, the 
Convention rights have only got an indirect influence on the scope of 
fundamental rights in the European Community so that the Community itself 
cannot be held responsible for possible infringements of these rights.4  The 
Member States, however, are bound by both: Community law and the ECHR.  
This means that when implementing Community law, the Member States must 
generally comply with the ECHR.   
On various occasions both the European Commission of Human Rights 
(ECommHR)5 and the ECtHR had to decide cases directed against Member 
States of the EC, concerning actions by Member States that had been 
determined by Community law.6  The two most important decisions for the 
present relationship between Community law and the ECHR are the cases of 
Matthews and Bosphorus.  According to the ECtHR‟s decision in Matthews, 
Member States are responsible if EC primary law (in that case the EC Act on 
Direct Elections of 1976) violates the Convention.7  The main reasons for this 
                                                                                                                             
Union” in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The General Law of E.C. External Relations 
(Sweet&Maxwell, London 2000), 774; Matthias Ruffert Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 
[1996], 197. In addition, the ECHR is presently only open to states. 
3
  Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca, EU Law (4th edn, OUP, Oxford 2007), 385-386; 
Christoph Grabenwarter Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (3rd edn, C. H. Beck, 
München 2008), 27. 
4
  CFTD v European Communities, (App no 8030/77) (1978) D.R. 13, 213; Dufay v 
European Communities, (App no 13539/88) (ECommHR 19 Jan 1989). 
5
  The ECommHR was abolished by the 11th protocol to the ECHR, which entered into 
force on 1 Nov 1998.  
6
  M & Co. v Germany (App no 13258/87) (1990) D.R. 64, 146; Procola v Luxembourg 
(App no 14570/89) (1993) D.R. 75, 5; Cantoni v France (App no 17862/91) (1996) ECHR 
1996-V; Senator Lines v 15 Member States of the EC (App no 56672/00) (2004) ECHR 2004-
IV; Emesa Sugar v Netherlands (App no 62023/00) (ECHR 13 Jan 2005). 
7
  Matthews v United Kingdom (App no 24833/94) (1999) ECHR 1999-I. Cf. case-notes 
by: Iris Canor “Primus inter pares. Who is the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights in 
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are that although the Member States are not excluded from transferring 
competences on an international organization, they remain responsible for 
infringements of the ECHR after such a transfer.8  Moreover, the respondent 
United Kingdom had freely agreed to be bound by the act in question and EC 
primary law cannot be challenged before the ECJ.9 
In the more recent Bosphorus decision, the ECtHR was faced with the 
question of whether an EU Member State, in this case Ireland, could be held 
responsible under the Convention for the mere execution of an EC 
Regulation.10 The ECtHR had to reconcile two basic principles: On the one 
hand, parties to the Convention are not prevented from transferring powers to 
an international organization.  On the other hand, a party cannot fully escape 
its responsibilities under the Convention by such a transfer.  According to the 
ECtHR, a Member State remains responsible under Article 1 ECHR for all 
acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether they are rooted in 
                                                                                                                             
Europe?” 25 European Law Review (2000), 3; Toby King “Ensuring human rights review of 
intergovernmental acts in Europe” 25 European Law Review (2000), 79; Sebastian Winkler 
“Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, das Europäische Parlament und der 
Schutz der Konventionsgrundrechte im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht” Europäische 
Grundrechte Zeitschrift [2001], 18. 
8
  Matthews (n. 7) para 32. 
9
  Matthews (n. 7) para 33. 
10
  Bosphorus v Ireland (App no 45036/98) 2005 ECHR 2005-VI; confirmed by 
Coopérative des agriculteurs de mayenne v France (App no 16931/04) (2006); cf. case notes 
on Bosphorus by: Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg 
and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis” 43 Common Market Law Review (2006), 
243; Alicia Hinarejos Parga “Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in 
Europe” 31 European Law Review (2006), 250; Cathryn Costello “The Bosphorus Ruling of 
the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in 
Europe‟” 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006), 87; Jean Paul Jacqué 41 Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Européen (2005), 749; Sebastian Winkler “Die Vermutung des „äquivalenten 
Grundrechtsschutzes‟ im Gemeinschaftsrecht nach dem Bosphorus-Urteil des EGMR” 
Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [2007], 641; Jürgen Bröhmer “Die Bosphorus-
Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte – Der Schutz der Grund- 
und Menschenrechte in der EU und das Verhältnis zur EMRK” Europäische Zeitung für 
Wirtschaftsrecht [2006], 71; Stefan Lorenzmeier “Das Verhältnis von europäischem 
Gemeinschaftsrecht und Europäischer Menschenrechtskonvention” Jura [2007], 370; Gerrit 
Schohe “Das Urteil Bosphorus: zum Unbehagen gegenüber dem Grundrechtsschutz durch 
die Gemeinschaft” Europäische Zeitung für Wirtschaftsrecht [2006] p. 33; Nikolaos Lavranos 
“Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH” Europarecht [2006], 79. 
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domestic law only or are a consequence of the State‟s membership in the 
EC. 11   An action taken in compliance with obligations arising from the 
membership in an international organization, however, can be justified as long 
as that organization protects human rights at least in a manner equivalent to 
that of the Convention, if the Member State has no discretion in implementing 
these obligations.12  Equivalent, according to the ECtHR, means comparable 
and not identical.  If such equivalent protection is found to exist, there will be a 
presumption that a State has not departed from the requirements of the 
Convention when it does not more than implement the obligations flowing 
from its membership in the organization.13   The presumption, however, is 
rebutted when the protection offered was „manifestly deficient‟, which would 
have to be examined on a case by case basis.  The ECtHR went on to 
conclude that the European Community did in fact afford such a level of 
protection and that the presumption in that case was not rebutted. 14  
Therefore the complaint was held to be unfounded.  The ECtHR also made it 
clear that the presumption in Bosphorus only operates where the Community 
law at issue could be challenged before the ECJ.  Therefore it does not apply 
                                            
11
  Bosphorus (n 10) paras 152-153. 
12
  Bosphorus (n 10) para 155. 
13
  Bosphorus (n 10) para 156. 
14
  Bosphorus (n 10) paras 159-166. The Bosphorus decision is reminiscent of the 
ECommHR‟s decision in M & Co. v Germany (App no 13258/87) (1990) D.R. 64, 146 where 
the ECommHR held that such complaints were inadmissible. A similar line of reasoning, albeit 
different in detail, can be found in the Solange II-decision by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court; cf. Alicia Hinarejos Parga „Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Europe‟ 31 European Law Review (2006), 250, 257-258; Cathryn 
Costello “The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights 
and Blurred Boundaries in Europe” 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) 87, 104-105; Jean-
Paul Jacqué, 41 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (2005), 749, 763; Stefan Lorenzmeier 
“Das Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und Europäischer 
Menschenrechtskonvention” Jura [2007], 370, 373; Gerrit Schohe “Das Urteil Bosphorus: zum 
Unbehagen gegenüber dem Grundrechtsschutz durch die Gemeinschaft” Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [2006]. 33; N. Lavranos “Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis 
von EGMR und EuGH“ Europarecht [2006], 79, 86. 
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where, as was the case in Matthews, the compliance of primary law with the 
ECHR is at issue.   
The Bosphorus decision further clarifies that the presumption only applies 
where the Member State had no discretion in implementing Community law.15  
Where the Member State had some degree of discretion, its responsibility will 
be the same as if a purely domestic act had been at issue.16  One of the 
questions left open by the ECtHR is whether the presumption also applies in 
cases where there has been no national act executing Community law.  Such 
a case could for instance arise, where an applicant directly challenges a 
decision rendered by the Commission and confirmed by the ECJ before the 
ECtHR.  Bosphorus is based on the presumption that the protection of human 
rights in Community law is equivalent to that under the Convention.  Therefore, 
the ECtHR presumes that in cases where the Community‟s Member States 
had no discretion when implementing secondary Community legislation that 
the Member States complied with the requirements of the Convention.  
Therefore, Bosphorus privileges secondary Community law as such.  Thus 
the presumption formulated by the ECtHR in Bosphorus must also be 
applicable in cases where there was no implementing action by Member 
States.17 
                                            
15
  The ECtHR therefore did not deviate from its previous Cantoni decision, Cantoni v 
France (App no 17862/91) ECHR 1996-V, where it held France responsible for the 
implementation of an EC directive.  
16
  Jean-Paul Jacqué, 41 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (2005), 749, 766; Alicia 
Hinarejos Parga „Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe‟ 31 
European Law Review (2006), 250, 257. 
17
  This view is shared by: Nikolaus Marsch and Anna-Catharina Sanders “Gibt es ein 
Recht der Parteien auf Stellungnahme zu den Schlussanträgen des Generalanwalts? Zur 
Vereinbarkeit des Verfahrens vor dem EuGH mit Art. 6 EMRK“ Europarecht [2008], 345, 361-
362; Sebastian Winkler “Die Vermutung des „äquivalenten“ Grundrechtsschutzes um 
Gemeinschaftsrecht nach dem Bosphorus-Urteil des EGMR“ Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift [2007], 641, 643; a more cautious approach is adopted by: C. Eckes “Does the 
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While the general tenor of the ECtHR‟s case law is that Member States 
cannot escape their obligations under the Convention, the Bosphorus decision 
must be regarded as proof of the continued silent cooperation and mutual 
respect between the ECtHR and the ECJ.  The ECJ regularly refers to the 
ECHR and the ECtHR‟s case law when adjudicating on fundamental rights in 
Community law, for which one of the main sources of inspiration is the 
ECHR.18   Therefore, the ECJ‟s interpretation of the fundamental rights in 
Community law will usually be parallel to that of a similar Convention right by 
the ECtHR. 19   Arguably, the quality of the ECJ‟s case law regarding 
fundamental rights has profited to a great extent from this parallelism in 
interpretation.20  The ECtHR, too, increasingly refers to the ECJ‟s case law, 
which helps to create a uniform human rights standard in Europe.21  This 
                                                                                                                             
European Court of Human Rights Provide Protection from the European Community? – The 
Case of Bosphorus Airways“ 13 European Public Law (2007), 47, 54. 
18
  The first reference to the ECHR is contained in: Case 4/73 Nold KG v Commission 
[1974] ECR 491, para 12; the first reference to the ECtHR‟s case law can be found in: Case 
C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, para 16; on (alleged) 
inconsistencies in the case law of the two courts cf. Dean Spielmann „Human Rights Case 
Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies and 
Complementarities‟ in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999), 757; 
Nina Philippi „Divergenzen im Grundrechtsschutz zwischen EuGH und EGMR‟ Zeitschrift für 
europarechtliche Studien [2000], 97.  For the reasons why the ECJ relies on the ECtHR‟s 
case law cf. Guy Harpaz “The European Court of Justice and its relations with the European 
Court of Human Rights: The quest for enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy” 46 
Common Market Law Review [2009], 105, 109 seq.  In addition, Harpaz argues for a „very 
strong albeit rebuttable presumption of deferral to the case law‟ of the ECtHR, ibid at p. 115. 
19
  E.g. Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935; Case C-112/00 
Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659; Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279;  cf. Anne Peters, Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (C. H. Beck, München 2003), 28-29; Hans Christian Krüger; 
Jörg Polakiewicz “Proposals for a Coherent Human Rights Protection System in Europe” 22 
Human Rights Law Jorunal (2001), 1, 6.  
20
  Cathryn. Costello “The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe” 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006), 
87, 129. 
21
  E.g. in Pellegrin v France (App no 28541/95) ECHR 1999-VIII 207, para 66 and 
Goodwin v United Kingdom (App no 28957/95) ECHR 2002-VI. The ECtHR also helped to 
enforce Community law, e. g. Hornsby v Greece (App no 18357/91) ECHR 1997-II; S. A. 
Dangeville v France (App no 36677/97) ECHR 2002-III; cf. Dean Spielmann “La constitution 
économique de l‟union européenne et les droits de l‟homme§” in O. Debarge et al. (eds), La 
constitution économique de l’union européenne’ (Bruylant, Bruxelles 2008), 297, 311-316; 
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cooperation, however, is not based on a legal duty to cooperate, but merely 
on comity.  That means that either court can unilaterally end this cooperation 
at any moment. 22   This is one of the reasons why an accession of the 
European Community to the ECHR should be welcomed as an accession 
would provide for a clear legal basis for the relationship between Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg.   
II. THE FUTURE PART I: ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE EU CHARTER 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
But before an accession of the EU to the ECHR will take place, it is likely that 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will enter into force.  The European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission solemnly proclaimed the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights at the Nice summit on 7 December 2000.23  As 
a consequence, the Charter is presently not binding.  However, both the ECJ 
and the CFI increasingly refer to its provisions as a confirmation for their 
findings regarding the Community‟s fundamental rights. 24   The reformed 
Article 6(1) TEU (Treaty of Lisbon) provides that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights will have the same value as the Treaties.  This means that the Charter 
will enter into force at the same time as the Treaty of Lisbon.  Similarly, the 
failed European Constitution contained the Charter as its Part II.  Even if the 
                                                                                                                             
Dean Spielmann, “La prise en compte et la promotion du droit communautaire par la Cour de 
Strasbourg” in Mélanges Petros Pararas, forthcoming, May 2009. 
22
  Nico Krisch “The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law” 71 Modern Law 
Review (2008), 183, 201.  
23
  2000 OJ, C364/1; the amended version of the Charter to become binding according 
to the Lisbon Treaty can be found at: 2007 OJ, C303/1. 
24
  For instance: Case C-540/03 Parliament/Council [2006] ECR I-5769, para 38; Case 
C-305/05 Advocaaten van de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3633, 
para 46; Case C-432/05 Unibet v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271, para 37; Case C-
438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line ABP OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, para 44; Case T-242/02 Sunrider v 
OHIM [2005] ECR II-2793, para 51.  
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Treaty of Lisbon shares the fate of the Constitution, it is very likely that a new 
reform treaty will again provide for the Charter eventually entering into force.  
Thus it seems justified to explore the relationship between the Charter and the 
ECHR after the Charter has become binding, and its influence on the 
relationship between the two European courts. 
A. The ECHR as a Minimum Standard 
Article 52 (3) of the Charter defines the relationship between the rights 
contained in the Charter and the ECHR:  
 
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. 
 
This article aims to prevent that the human rights standard set by the Charter 
being lower than that of the ECHR.  Article 52 of the Charter deals with the 
scope of the rights guaranteed.  Therefore, a restriction of a fundamental right 
that is also guaranteed by the ECHR can only be justified, if that restriction 
would also be permissible under the ECHR.  Therefore, Article 52 (3) provides 
for the ECHR as a minimum standard of human rights in the EU.  Article 52 (3) 
thus leads the EU to be indirectly bound by the ECHR as it must always be 
obeyed when restricting fundamental rights in the EU.  The aim of Article 52 
(3) is to prevent Member States from being subjected to two different 
standards of human rights protection when implementing EU law.  Therefore 
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Article 52 (3) not only protects the status quo of the ECHR, but must also be 
read as a dynamic reference to the ECHR and its additional protocols.  
Should the ECHR be substantively amended in the future, these amendments 
will automatically become the new minimum standard of human rights 
protection in the EU.25   
A list of corresponding rights can be found in the official explanations relating 
to the Charter.26  According to Article 52 (7) of the Charter, these explanations 
„shall be given due regard by the Courts of the Union and the Member States‟ 
when interpreting the Charter.  Considering that Article 52 (7) does not 
provide for the explanations to be binding but merely postulates a duty to duly 
regard them, it cannot be excluded that future case law will add other rights to 
that list.   
B. Does Article 52 (3) make ECtHR case law binding? 
Having established that Article 52 (3) of the Charter makes the ECHR the 
minimum standard when interpreting provisions of the Charter that correspond 
to those of the ECHR, the question arises whether the interpreter of such 
provisions is also bound by the ECtHR‟s case law regarding those rights.  The 
fact that only the ECtHR‟s (dynamic) interpretation shaped the rights 
                                            
25
  Kolja Naumann “Art. 52 Abs. 3 GrCh zwischen Kohärenz des europäischen 
Grundrechtsschutzes und Autonomie des Unionsrechts“ Europarecht [2008], 424, 426; Julia 
Molthagen Das Verhältnis der EU-Grundrechte zur EMRK, PhD thesis Hamburg 2003, 
<http://www.sub.uni-hamburg.de/opus/volltexte/2003/967/>, 23 April 2009, at p. 89; Marc 
Fischbach “Grundrechte-Charta und Menschenrechtskonvention“ in W. Heusel (ed.), 
Grundrechtecharta und Verfassungsentwicklung in der EU (Bundesanzeiger-Verlag, Köln 
2002), 125, 126. 
26
  Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007, C 302/33-34; 
that list, however, is not exhaustive: Yvonne Dorf “Zur Interpretation der 
Grundrechtecharta“ Juristenzeitung [2005], 126, 129; Molthagen (n 25); Nina Philippi Die 
Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2002), 44-45;  
Thomas von Danwitz “Art 52 Grundrechtecharta“ in P. J. Tettinger; K. Stern (eds.), Kölner 
Gemeinschaftskommentar zur Europäischen Grundrechte-Charta (C.H. Beck, München 2006) 
para 55. 
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contained in the ECHR and made the ECHR probably the most successful 
international human rights instrument, might suggest that that should be the 
case.  Lenaerts and de Smijter contend that because the ECHR establishes 
the ECtHR and because the ECtHR interprets the rights laid down in the 
ECHR ex tunc it had to be assumed that the case law of the ECtHR formed 
an integral part of the meaning and scope of those rights.27  Considering that 
the ECJ will become the main interpreter of the Charter, such a result would 
lead to the ECJ being bound by the decisions of the ECtHR when interpreting 
the Charter.  Regarding those rights, this would lead to a hierarchy of the two 
Courts with the ECtHR being at the top of that hierarchy.   
When we look at the wording of Article 52 (3), however, we cannot find any 
express reference to the ECtHR‟s case law.  Only the ECHR itself is 
mentioned.  The question is therefore, whether Article 52 (3) can nonetheless 
be interpreted as containing such a reference.  On the one hand, it is unlikely 
that the drafters of Article 52 (3) wanted a mere reference to the 50 year old 
text of the ECHR, especially considering that the ECHR has for a long time 
been dynamically interpreted as a „living instrument‟ by the ECtHR and thus 
been rendered a great deal more precisely.28  On the other hand, if one were 
to accept that the case law of the ECtHR will bind the interpreters of the 
                                            
27
  Koen Lenaerts and Eddy de Smijter “The Charter and the Role of the European 
Courts“ 8 Maastricht Journal of European Law [2001], 90, 99; a similar argument is put 
forward by Christian Busse “Das Projekt der europäischen Grundrechtscharta vor dem 
Hintergrund der EMRK“ Thüringisches Verwaltungsblatt [2001], 73, 79; similar but without 
giving reasons: Lord Goldsmith “The Charter of Rights – a brake not an 
accelerator“ European Human Rights Law Review [2004], 473, 476; Nikolaos Lavranos „Das 
So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH“ Europarecht [2006], 79, 80. 
28
  Naumann (n 25) p. 425; Johan Callewaert “Die EMRK und die EU-
Grundrechtecharta” Europäische Grundrechtezeitung [2003], 198, 199; Johan Callewaert 
“Les rapports entre la Charte et la Convention européenne des droits de l‟homme” in W. 
Heusel (ed.), Grundrechtecharta und Verfassungsentwicklung in der EU (Bundesanzeiger-
Verlag, Köln 2002), 129, 132; Martin Borowsky “Art. 52” in J. Meyer (ed.), Charta der 
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Charter, this would mean that every further step in the development of human 
rights protection by the ECtHR would automatically become part of EU law.29   
The official explanations regarding Art 52 (3) explicitly mention the case law.  
They state that „[t]he meaning and scope of the guaranteed rights are 
determined not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union‟.30  This certainly means that the case law of the ECtHR will 
be of great relevance when interpreting the corresponding rights in the EU-
Charter.  The preamble to the EU-Charter is phrased in a similar manner in 
that it also refers to the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ.  However, 
Article 52 (7) only postulates a duty to duly regard these explanations and 
thus merely a duty to duly regard the ECtHR‟s case law.  This does not imply 
that the interpreter of the EU-Charter must strictly follow that case law.  
Therefore, these explanations alone cannot provide a sufficient basis for the 
assumption that the ECJ would be bound by the ECtHR‟s case law.  
However, a duty to follow the case law could follow from the object and 
purpose of Art 52 (3), which aims at a parallel interpretation of both the ECHR 
and the EU-Charter in order to avoid that the ECtHR might regard an act of 
EU law, which had previously been sanctioned by the ECJ, to infringe the 
ECHR.  After all, the most effective way of avoiding such a situation would be 
a strict duty to follow the ECtHR‟s case law.   
                                                                                                                             
Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (2nd edn, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2006) para 37; 
Philippi (n 26), 45; Dorf (n 26), 128. 
29
  Borowsky (n 28) para 37; Gerhard Ress “Die Europäische Grundrechtscharta und 
das Verhältnis zwischen EGMR, EuGH und den nationalen Verfassungsgerichten” in 
A. Duschanek and S. Griller (eds), Grundrechte für Europa (Springer, Wien 2002), 183, 206. 
30
  OJ 2007, C 302/33 [emphasis added]. 
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Yet such an explicit duty is nowhere to be found in the EU-Charter.  Moreover, 
there had been various attempts to include an explicit reference to the 
ECtHR‟s case law during the Convention, which was responsible for drafting 
the Charter.31  Yet the Convention found it impossible to agree upon such a 
reference.32  Thus both the wording and the drafting history of the Charter do 
not support a strict bindingness of the ECtHR „s case law on the ECJ when 
interpreting the EU-Charter. 
There is also a further, more general argument against the assumption that 
the ECtHR‟s case law should be binding on the ECJ: such a duty would be 
alien to European Union law.  Court decisions under EU law are only binding 
inter partes.  A duty to generally follow the case law of the ECtHR would 
implicate a great change in EU law, as it would basically introduce a doctrine 
of stare decisis as is typical for the common law.  Were the ECJ to follow the 
case law of the ECtHR, the doctrine would go even further than normal as it 
would mean that a court of one legal order (the ECJ) would be bound by the 
decisions of a court of another legal order (the ECtHR).  In addition, a doctrine 
of stare decisis only makes sense where there is a clear hierarchy of courts, 
including the possibility to file an appeal against decisions by the inferior 
court(s).  An appeal gives the higher court an opportunity to review its own 
case law and adjust it.  Therefore it would be necessary to introduce a 
                                            
31
  CHARTE 4372/00 (CONVENT 39) containing proposals by the following members of 
the Convention: J. Meyer (p. 282); J.-P. Bonde (p. 487); J. Voggenhuber and K. Buitenweg 
(p. 560); D. Tarschys (p. 562); in addition, one of the observers of the Council of Europe 
argued in favour of such a reference: Marc Fischbach “Le Conseil de l‟Europe et la Charte 
des droits fondamentaux de l‟union européenne” Revue Universelle des Droits de l'Homme 
[2000] 7, 8. 
32
  Regarding the discussions in the Convention: Jonas Bering Liisberg “Does the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law?” 38 Common 
Market Law Review (2001), 1171, 1172; Molthagen (n 25); Margit Bühler Einschränkung von 
Grundrechten nach der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta (Duncker&Humblodt, Berlin 2005), 
320-321. 
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procedural means that would either enable a party to appeal to the ECtHR or 
that would allow the ECJ to make a preliminary reference to the ECtHR, in 
order to get guidance on the interpretation of the ECHR.  That, however, is 
not the case.  Moreover, the present right to file an individual complaint under 
Article 34 ECHR cannot be regarded as a sufficient alternative to a formal 
appeal to the ECtHR for two reasons: Firstly, as long as the EU is not a party 
to the ECHR, such an individual complaint could only be directed against a 
Member State.  Secondly, according to the Bosphorus presumption such a 
complaint would almost always be unsuccessful. It would not constitute a 
viable tool for an exchange between the two courts.   
The foregoing arguments show that making the ECtHR‟s decisions binding on 
the ECJ would mean a paradigm shift in EU law.  Had such a shift been 
wanted, an express provision would surely have been included in the EU 
Charter.  Moreover, the ECtHR itself is not bound by its own decisions, nor 
does the ECHR provide that the national courts of the parties to the 
Convention be bound by its rulings.  Article 46 ECHR only stipulates for a 
decision being binding inter partes.   
Considering in addition, that both the preamble and the explanations to 
Article 52 (3) of the EU Charter mention the ECJ alongside the ECtHR 
suggests that neither Court is to be regarded superior to the other, but rather 
that both courts are regarded to co-exist as equals.33  For if one argues on 
that basis, that an interpreter of corresponding rights of the Charter and the 
ECHR should be bound by the case law of the ECtHR, one must also argue 
                                            
33
  Stefan Lorenzmeier ‟Das Verhältnis von Europäischem Gerichtshof und 
Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte – Konflikt oder Kooperation?‟ in J. Bast et al 
(eds.), Die Europäische Verfassung - Verfassungen in Europa (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2005), 
209, 223. 
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that such an interpreter is bound by the case law of the ECJ.  Considering that 
the ECJ will be the final interpreter of the EU Charter, this would result in the 
ECJ being bound not only by the case law of the ECtHR, but also by its own 
case law.  In a scenario where the case law of both courts is contradictory, the 
ECJ would thus be bound by both its own case law and that of the ECtHR.  
For the ECJ this would result in a conflict between the duty to follow the 
ECtHR‟s case law on the one hand, and the duty to follow its own case law on 
the other.  This shows that in such a case the purpose of Article 52 (3), which 
is to create coherence and consistency in European human rights law, would 
not be better served if there was no legal duty to follow either case law.   
Moreover, the mentioning of the ECtHR‟s case law in the preamble of the EU 
Charter occurs in the context of the sources of the Charter rights and not in 
the context of the relationship between the EU Charter and the ECHR.34  The 
preamble therefore suggests that the ECtHR‟s case law is merely one of 
several aids to interpreting the EU Charter.  Therefore, it follows neither from 
Article 52 (7) nor from the preamble that the case law of the ECtHR is binding.  
The explanations to Article 52 themselves confirm this result in that they 
stress that the autonomy of EU law and the ECJ must not be affected by 
Article 52 (3).35   
In conclusion, one cannot assume that once the EU Charter has entered into 
force, the ECJ will be bound by the case law of the ECtHR when interpreting 
rights that correspond to those of the ECHR.   
                                            
34
  Molthagen (n 25) p. 126. 
35
  OJ 2007, C 302/33. 
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IV. THE FUTURE PART II: ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the entry into force of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights will not be the final step in the development of human 
rights in the EU.  Article 6 (2) of the new TEU provides that „the Union shall 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms‟.36  The inclusion of that provision was necessary as 
the ECJ decided in Opinion 2/94, that the European Community could not 
accede to the ECHR for lack of competence.37  Regarding the Convention, a 
new Article 59 (2), introduced by Protocol 14 to the ECHR, will provide for a 
possibility of accession for the EU.38  Once the EU has become a party to the 
ECHR, further questions regarding the relationship between the two European 
courts will arise:  First, the question of the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to 
interpret agreements concluded by the EU;  second, the question of the future 
of the Bosphorus presumption and third whether according to the obiter 
dictum in Opinion 1/91, the ECJ will be bound by the decisions of the ECtHR. 
A. The exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ after an accession 
1. The exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ 
In order to accede to the ECHR, the EU39 will conclude an agreement of 
accession according to the procedure laid down in Article 218 (8) of the Treaty 
                                            
36
  Art. I-9 of the failed European Constitution contained an identically worded provision. 
37
  Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; this opinion had been 
requested following a long academic and political discussion; see e.g. Brid Moriarty‚ EC 
Accession to the ECHR‟ Hibernian Law Journal [2001], 13, 15. 
38
  Art. 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, CETS No 194; that Protocol has so far been 
ratified by all members of the Council of Europe save Russia.  
39
  For the purpose of this chapter, I will refer to the „EU‟ as a future party considering 
that the „Community‟ as a separate organization will cease to exist with the Treaty of Lisbon.  
For the readers‟ convenience I will refer to the provisions of the EC Treaty as they presently 
stand. 
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of the Functioning of the European Union.  According to Article 216 (2) of that 
Treaty (the present Article 300 (7) EC Treaty), the agreements concluded by 
the EU are binding on the EU and its Member States.  Since its decision in the 
Haegeman case the ECJ has consistently held that the provisions of an 
agreement concluded by the Community form an integral part of Community 
law.40  An agreement of the Community can be regarded as an act of one of 
the institutions of the Community within the meaning of Article 234 (1) (b) EC 
Treaty, so that the ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret it without there being a 
piece of Community legislation implementing the agreement in Community 
law.   
In Haegeman, which dealt with the provisions of a mixed agreement, the ECJ 
did not yet draw a distinction between agreements concluded by the 
Community alone and mixed agreements.  That distinction was made by the 
Court in Demirel, where the ECJ distinguished between those provisions of a 
mixed agreement that fell into the jurisdiction of the Community and those that 
fell into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States.41  Only in the latter 
case does the ECJ not have jurisdiction.42  This case law has since been 
confirmed.43 
                                            
40
  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, para 5. 
41
  Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719 para 9; a detailed 
analysis of the ECJ‟s case law can be found in: Koutrakos (n 2) pp. 192-205.  
42
  Panos Koutrakos “The Interpretation of Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure” (2002) 7 European Foreign Affairs Review, 25, 30-34; Opinion of AG 
Tesauro, Case 53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice [1998] ECR I-3606 
para 18; this interpretation of Demirel is criticized by Alan Dashwood “Preliminary Rulings on 
the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements” in D. O`Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), Judicial Review 
in European Law, Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hedley (Kluwer, The Hague 
2000), 167, 170. 
43
  Case C-13/00 Commission/Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943 para 14; Case C-239/03 
Commission/France [2004] ECR I-9325 para 25; Case C-459/03 Commission/Ireland [2006] 
ECR I-4635, para 84; cf. Erich Vranes “Gemischte Abkommen und die Zuständigkeit des 
EuGH – Grundfragen und neuere Entwicklungen in den Außenbeziehungen” [2009] EuR p. 
44 at p. 59. 
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It follows from Article 220 and 292 EC Treaty that the jurisdiction of the ECJ to 
interpret such agreements is exclusive. Article 292 EC Treaty reads: 
 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for 
therein.
44
 
 
The object and purpose of that provision is to ensure that Community law is 
interpreted in a consistent manner, which can most efficiently be attained by 
making the Community courts the only courts deciding issues of Community 
law.  The reference to „this Treaty‟ in Article 292 EC Treaty not only refers to 
the EC Treaty as such, but also to secondary legislation.45  The exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ECJ was the reason why the ECJ in Opinion 1/91 held the 
draft agreement on the European Economic Area to be incompatible with the 
EC Treaty.46  That agreement provided for the establishment of an EEA Court, 
which was to decide about disputes between the „contracting parties of the 
agreement‟, i.e. the EC, its Member States and the EFTA States.  Depending 
on the case in question, a „contracting party‟ could either mean the EC, a 
Member State or the EC and its Member States together depending on the 
distribution of competences under Community law.  In case of a dispute, the 
EEA Court would have been forced to decide which party was internally 
competent under Community law, in order to decide who was to be regarded 
                                            
44
  Art. 193 of the Euratom Treaty is worded in a similar manner. 
45
  Jonkheer H. F van Panhuys “Conflicts Between the Law of the European 
Communities and Other Rules of International Law” 3 Common Market Law Review (1965-
1966), 420, 443; Bernhard Wegener “Art. 292” in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert 
(eds.), EUV/EGV (3rd edn C.H. Beck, München 2007); Christoph Herrmann “Art. 292” in R. 
Streinz (ed.), EUV/EGV (C.H. Beck, München 2003).  
46
  Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079. 
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as the „contracting party‟ for the dispute.47  The ECJ regarded that power 
conferred to the EEA Court to be incompatible with Community law as that 
power was exclusively vested in the ECJ according to Article 220 EC Treaty, 
a finding which was confirmed by Article 292 EC Treaty. 48   Opinion 1/91 
shows that the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret Community law 
not only flows from the express provision of Article 292 EC Treaty, but is 
inherent in the Community legal system.   
However, the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret Community law 
does not end here.  It also extends to the interpretation of agreements 
concluded by the Community.  In the Mox Plant-Case, for instance, a mixed 
agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
was at issue.  Here the Commission alleged that Ireland had breached the EC 
Treaty by submitting a dispute with the United Kingdom to the dispute 
settlement mechanism under UNCLOS.49  UNCLOS had been concluded by 
the Community as a mixed agreement.  The ECJ held that Ireland had in fact 
breached its obligations under the EC Treaty by submitting a dispute 
regarding provisions of the UNCLOS  to a forum other than the ECJ, as the 
Community had exercised its competence regarding the provisions in 
question.50 Therefore these provisions had to be regarded as an integral part 
                                            
47
  Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 para 34. 
48
  Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 para 35. 
49
  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635. 
50
  Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635, para 83-139; for detailed 
analyses of that judgment see: Nikolaos Lavranos “The MOX Plant Judgment of the ECJ: 
How Exclusive is the Jurisdiction of the ECJ?” European Environmental Law Review [2006], 
291; Nikolaos Lavranos “The MOX Plant and Ijzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the 
Supreme Arbiter?” 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), 223; Nikolaos Lavranos 
“Protecting ist Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Mox Plant-Judgment of the ECJ” 5 Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2006), 479; Nikolaos Lavranos “The scope of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice” 32 E.L.Rev. (2007), 83; Cesare P. Romano 
101 American Journal of International Law (2007), 171; Bernhard Wegener 
“Familienstreitigkeiten nicht nach außen tragen?!” Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht [2006], 582; 
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of Community law for the interpretation of which the ECJ had exclusive 
jurisdiction.  
Regarding the ECHR, the question is whether the ECJ will also claim to be 
(solely) competent to interpret its provisions as far as Community law is 
concerned.  The ECHR will be acceded by the EU alone because the Member 
States are already parties to it.  Nonetheless it will have to be qualified as a 
mixed agreement, as both the EU and the Member States will be parties to it.  
According to the ECJ‟s Haegeman case law, the ECHR will thus become an 
integral part of EU law and the ECJ will have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret 
it.  The question of course is whether that will generally be the case or only in 
certain circumstances.  The difference to a „normal‟ mixed agreement will be 
that the reason for a membership of both the EU and its Member States 
differs from the normal situation, where neither could alone be a member of 
the whole agreement due to a division of competences between the EU and 
its Member States.  That would not be the case here as the EU does not have 
the competence regarding certain human rights while the Member States are 
competent regarding certain other human rights.  Therefore the decisive factor 
for the ECJ‟s jurisdiction regarding the ECHR cannot be whether the relevant 
provision of the ECHR falls in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States.  
It is rather suggested that only if EU law was applicable in the case at 
question, the ECJ will have jurisdiction to interpret it.  This means that the 
                                                                                                                             
Karen Kaiser “Ausschließliche Zuständigkeit des EuGH bei Auslegung und Anwendung von 
zum Gemeinschaftsrecht gehörenden Bestimmungen” Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht [2006], 464; Raphael Oen “Streitschlichtung zwischen EG-Mitgliedstaaten im 
Rahmen gemischter Verträge” 45 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2007), 136. 
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ECJ will not be able to claim jurisdiction in cases concerning wholly internal 
situations such as criminal law.51   
2. The Conflict With the ECtHR‟s Exclusive Jurisdiction 
The ECJ‟s jurisprudence on its own exclusive jurisdiction to interpret 
agreements concluded by the EU, might, however, clash with the ECtHR‟s 
exclusive jurisdiction in inter-state disputes according to Article 55 ECHR. 
Article 55 ECHR reads: 
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they 
will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force 
between them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute 
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention to a means 
of settlement other than those provided for in this Convention. 
This provision leads to an exclusive jurisdiction of the ECtHR over disputes 
between the parties to the Convention under Article 33 ECHR.  After the EU 
has acceded to the ECHR, cases between its Member States or between the 
EU and a Member State could potentially be adjudicated by the ECJ 
(Article 226 and 227 EC Treaty) and the ECtHR.  Considering that both courts 
would regard their jurisdiction as exclusive, one must ask which court would 
be competent to adjudicate such cases.  A conflict of jurisdiction could thus 
arise.   
In contrast to that of the ECJ, the exclusive competence of the ECtHR is not 
an absolute one as it allows for special agreements between the parties to the 
Convention regarding their disputes.  One possibility to solve this jurisdictional 
                                            
51
  In contrast to this, A. G. Toth “The European Union and Human Rights: The Way 
Forward” 34 Common Market Law Review [1997], 491, 509, argues that the ECJ would have 
jurisdiction over any provision of the ECHR irrespective of whether the matter falls within the 
competence of the EC or the Member States. 
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conflict would be to regard Article 220 and 292 EC as a „special agreement‟ 
between the Member States and the EU.  The question is, however, whether 
it is possible to regard these articles as such an agreement.  Firstly, it could 
be argued that Article 55 ECHR requires that the special agreement be 
concluded between all the parties to the Convention.  And secondly, one 
could contend that Article 55 ECHR demands that the special agreement 
must specifically refer to the ECHR.  Neither condition would be fulfilled by 
Article 220 and 292 EC as the EC Treaty is an agreement only between some 
of the parties to the Convention and it is phrased in a general manner. 
(a)  Agreement Only Between the EU and its Member States 
Addressing the first issue whether an agreement only between the EU and its 
Member States is sufficient to satisfy Article 55 ECHR one first has to 
concede that the wording of Article 55 ECHR is not clear in this respect.52  
The ECommHR argued that it was enough to satisfy the requirements of ex 
Art 62 ECHR, which was phrased in exactly the same manner as Article 55 
ECHR, if both parties to the dispute have agreed upon another procedure 
than that before the ECommHR.53  The ECommHR‟s interpretation in this 
decision is supported by the travaux préparatoires.  The Swedish proposal 
regarding that article expressly stated that „the parties concerned‟ could 
decide to submit the dispute in question to another forum.54  That proposal 
                                            
52
  Some commentators contend that the agreement has to be concluded between all 
the parties to the ECHR: Joachim A. Frowein and Wolfgang Peukert EMRK-Kommentar 
Art. 62 (2nd edn, N. P. Engel Verlag, Kehl 1996); Wilhelm H. Wilting Vertragskonkurrenz im 
Völkerrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln 1996), 223. 
53
  Cyprus v Turkey (App No 25781/94) ECommHR 28 June 1996. 
54
  Collected Edition of the „Travaux Préparatoires‟ of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Volume 5 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1979), 58; the proposal 
was phrased: „The Commission and the European Court having been created to settle 
disputes relating to the interpretation and the application of this Convention, such disputes 
shall not be submitted to other judicial or arbitral tribunals established by treaties or 
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was not rejected during the drafting process of the ECHR.  Only the wording 
was slightly changed so that one can infer that the drafters did not want to 
substantially change the Swedish proposal.  Such an interpretation is 
supported by the nature of the ECHR compared to that of the EU.  The latter 
is an autonomous legal order, which avails of a Court of Justice with an 
exclusive jurisdiction, in order to ensure a coherent interpretation of EU law.  
In contrast to that, the ECHR cannot be regarded as an autonomous legal 
order, as it aims at protecting universal human rights.  Therefore the exclusive 
jurisdiction given to the ECtHR by Article 55 ECHR does not seem to serve 
the purpose of protecting the ECHR from being interpreted by another forum 
as was argued by Shany.55  Rather it was the aim of Article 55 ECHR to 
prevent parties to the Convention being subjected to international adjudication 
against their will.  This can only be understood before the background of the 
original version of the ECHR.  The original legal situation was comparable to 
that before the ICJ, in that the parties had to agree to the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR.56  Therefore, Article 55 ECHR was mainly designed to prevent that a 
party to the Convention would be forced to respond to a dispute concerning 
the ECHR before another court, if that other court could claim jurisdiction over 
disputes between the parties.  Thus there is neither any evidence from the 
drafting process, nor from the object and purpose of Article 55 ECHR, that the 
special agreement under Article 55 ECHR would have to be concluded 
between all the parties to the ECHR.  It follows that a special agreement 
between some of the parties to the ECHR suffices.   
                                                                                                                             
declarations in force unless the Parties concerned shall so decide by an agreement expressly 
relating to the dispute in question‟. 
55
  Shany (n 1), 191. 
56
  Ex Art. 48 ECHR. 
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(b)  Specific reference to ECHR in the special agreement 
The second question is whether a „special agreement‟ pursuant to Article 55 
ECHR has to refer specifically to the ECHR or whether it is sufficient if that 
agreement simply confers jurisdiction over a certain type of disputes over 
Convention rights, e.g. where both parties to a dispute before the ICJ 
generally accepted its jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36 (2) of the ICJ 
Statute.  Only if that were the case, would Article 220, 292 EC Treaty qualify 
as such a special agreement.  The intention of the drafters of the ECHR was 
to avoid that parties to the Convention would be subjected to court 
proceedings on the basis of general jurisdiction clauses.  Article 55 ECHR (ex 
Article 62) was especially aimed at declarations according to Article 36 (2) of 
the ICJ Statute, with which a State can declare that it generally accepts the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.  In such a case, Article 55 ECHR was supposed to 
prevent such a dispute, by prescribing the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECtHR. 
Therefore the drafting history suggests that a general clause such as 
Article 220, 292 EC would not be sufficient.   
However, it seems that the original idea behind Article 55 ECHR is no longer 
applicable as the jurisdiction of the ECtHR has become obligatory after 
Protocol 11 entered into force on 1 November 1998.  Therefore, parties to the 
Convention no longer need to be protected from being subjected to court 
proceedings alleging an infringement of the ECHR as they now must answer 
these cases in any event.  Nonetheless, Article 55 (ex Article 62) ECHR 
remained part of the Convention.  Therefore one may wonder which function 
that provision now has, as the parties to the Convention can no longer escape 
their responsibilities thereunder.  It is unlikely that the drafters of Protocol 11 
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merely overlooked Article 55 and forgot to remove it from the Convention, 
because they changed its numbering.  Thus one can conclude that Article 55 
ECHR has a function that differs from that of ex Article 62 ECHR.  Being an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, the function of Article 55 ECHR can now only be 
to generally exclude other courts and tribunals from deciding cases based on 
the ECHR, in order to ensure its consistent interpretation by the ECtHR.  
Considering that the ECtHR is the only court deciding on (the far more 
frequent) applications by individuals according to Article 34 ECHR, it makes 
sense to confer a similar exclusivity to the ECtHR regarding inter-state cases.  
The question then is, why Article 55 ECHR still provides for a possibility to 
present the dispute to another forum.  That can be explained by the fact that 
the ECHR, in contrast to the EU, is not an autonomous and self-contained 
legal order.57  Therefore the parties should be given the opportunity to have 
the dispute decided by another forum if they expressly wish to do so.  Thus 
Article 55 ECHR creates a default rule that the ECtHR is competent to 
adjudicate inter-state disputes.  Bearing in mind that exceptions to the rule 
must be construed narrowly, an agreement transferring jurisdiction to another 
forum will have to specifically relate to the ECHR. Therefore the general 
exclusive competence of the ECJ according to Article 220 and 292 EC Treaty 
does not satisfy the requirements of Article 55 ECHR.  Thus both the ECJ and 
ECHR will be competent to adjudicate such inter-state disputes.  Therefore, a 
conflict of jurisdictions arises. 
In order to solve that conflict, the EU and its Member States would have to 
conclude a special agreement explicitly referring to the ECHR stating that the 
                                            
57
  The ECJ recently confirmed that autonomy in its Kadi judgment, cf. Joined Cases 
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Convention will be interpreted by the ECJ in cases between the Member 
States or between a Member State and the EU.58  Such an agreement will 
preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ and will at the same time be in 
accordance with the requirements of the ECHR. 
B. The new relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR  
1. The Future of the Bosphorus presumption 
As already mentioned, the present relationship between the ECJ and the 
ECtHR is characterized by a mutual exercise of comity in that both courts 
respect the work of the other.  In Bosphorus, the ECtHR showed a great 
degree of deference towards the ECJ, in that it is presumed that the human 
rights protection under Community law is equivalent to that required by the 
ECHR.  However, it is doubtful whether that presumption will still be justifiable 
after an accession.  An accession of the EU to the ECHR will provide for a 
solid legal basis for a review of alleged human rights violations committed by 
the organs of the EU.  That review will also include decisions of the ECJ.  As 
previously mentioned, the Bosphorus presumption should be applied in cases 
where only the Community acted.  It would hardly be justifiable if that 
presumption were to be retained in such cases, because it would deprive the 
ECtHR of a great deal of cases arising within the EU.  It would moreover lead 
to an unequal treatment of the different parties to the ECHR, in that the 
                                                                                                                             
402/05 P and 415/05 P Kadi and al Barakaat v Council Judgment of 3 September 2008, nyr.   
58
  Others have argued that it would become necessary to make a reservation (Art. 57 
ECHR) or even completely exclude the possibility of an inter-state dispute for all Member 
States and the EU: European Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the European 
Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Bulletin of the European Commission, Supplement 2/79, para 27;  pleadings by 
the Spanish government regarding Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; 
Molthagen (n 25) p. 195; Gerhard Baumgartner “EMKR und Gemeinschaftsrecht” Zeitschrift 
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presumption would privilege the EU.59  Considering that the ECtHR does not 
grant such a privilege to any of the highest national courts of the parties to the 
ECHR, such a privilege for the ECJ is hardly justifiable.60  This argument is 
reinforced by the fact that such a privilege is even denied to those national 
courts that provide for a more effective protection of human rights than the 
ECJ, e.g. by granting easier access.  In addition, after an accession to the 
ECHR, the need for the ECtHR to exercise comity will have ended.  The 
justification for the exercise of comity was that the relationship between the 
two European courts is presently not fully clear.  After an accession that will 
no longer be the case.  Therefore, it is to be expected that the ECtHR will give 
up its Bosphorus jurisprudence after an accession.61 
2. Binding Effect of ECtHR decisions on the ECJ according to Opinion 
1/91? 
A further question is whether an accession by the EU to the ECHR could lead 
the ECJ to apply its famous dictum in Opinion 1/91 for the first time, thus 
making the ECtHR‟s case law binding for the ECJ.  It reads: 
                                                                                                                             
für Verwaltung [1996], 319, 330; Steering Committee on Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 
Addendum 2, para 63. 
59
  Even regarding the present relationship between the two courts an alleged double-
standard has been criticized, cf. the joint concurring opinion by Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, 
Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki in the Bosphorus case, para. 4; Eckes (n 17), 
65. 
60
  After an accession, the proceedings before the ECJ will can no longer be regarded as 
„another procedure of international investigation or settlement‟ according to Art. 35 ECHR as 
the ECJ will have to be treated like any highest court of a party to the Convention: Steering 
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Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own system of 
courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the 
Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result to interpret its 
provisions, the decisions of that court will be binding on the Community 
institutions, including the Court of Justice.  Those decisions will also be 
binding in the event that the Court of Justice is called upon to rule, by way of 
preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the interpretation of the 
international agreement, in so far as that agreement is an integral part of the 
Community legal order.
62
  
As the ECHR constitutes an international agreement with its own court, the 
dictum seems to be applicable.  The rationale behind the binding effect of 
these decisions on the organs of the Community, which includes the ECJ, is 
that the EU as a party to an agreement, is bound by that agreement.  If that 
agreement provides that the parties to it are bound by the decisions of the 
Court established to interpret the agreement, the EU, and therefore its organs 
(including the ECJ), are bound by these decisions.  It is, however, not clear 
from the above quote how far that binding effect of decisions goes.  It is rather 
unlikely that the ECJ intended to introduce a doctrine of stare decisis through 
the back door as such a doctrine does not exist anywhere in Community or 
international law.  Moreover, under international law only the decisions 
rendered in proceedings to which the EU was a party, are binding on it.  
Considering the rationale behind the dictum in Opinion 1/91 is to be found in 
international law, the ECJ is only bound by an interpretation of an international 
agreement rendered in cases where the EU was a party to the proceedings.  
Regarding the ECHR, this is evidenced by Article 46 ECHR, which shows that 
the decisions of the ECtHR are only binding inter partes.  Therefore, the ECJ 
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is only bound by those decisions to which the EU was a party.  It follows that 
where the ECtHR finds that the EU has violated the rights guaranteed in the 
ECHR, the ECJ will be bound by that decision when interpreting provisions of 
the ECHR in a subsequent case dealing with the same issue.  Such a 
situation might, for example, arise where the applicant has suffered a damage 
due to the EU‟s human rights violation and then sues the EU according to the 
present Article 288 (2) EC Treaty.63  The ECJ will in such a case be required 
to decide whether there has been a violation of the ECHR.  Where the 
applicant has already obtained a judgment by the ECtHR finding an 
infringement of the ECHR regarding the same matter, the ECJ is bound to 
follow that judgment.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the two European courts is likely to undergo 
significant changes in the future.  Presently, the ECtHR puts the ECJ in a 
privileged position as the ECtHR will generally presume that the ECHR was 
not violated in cases where there was a possibility of judicial review by the 
ECJ and where the Member State held responsible for an alleged violation of 
the ECHR did not have discretion in implementing Community law.  This 
approach is justified by the fact that the ECJ usually follows the ECtHR‟s 
interpretation of the ECHR and thereby helps to maintain a relatively high 
human standard in the European Community.  This situation will not 
significantly change once the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has entered 
into force.  The ECHR will remain the minimum human rights standard in the 
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EU.  The ECJ will be bound to interpret the ECHR but will not be bound to 
follow the ECtHR‟s case law.  It can, however, be expected that the 
cooperation between the two European courts will increase somewhat further.  
After the EU‟s accession to the ECHR, the present coexistence of the two 
European courts will change.  The ECJ‟s decisions will become directly 
reviewable by the ECtHR.  In addition, the reason for the Bosphorus 
jurisprudence, which puts the ECJ in a privileged position relative to national 
courts, will disappear and that jurisprudence will probably be given up.  
Moreover, the ECJ will be bound to follow the ECtHR‟s decisions, where the 
EU was a party to previous proceedings in the same matter. 
 
